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On 16 February 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) issued an 
interlocutory decision regarding the legal definition of terrorism.[1] This decision was in 
response to a Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) list of questions requesting, inter alia, an elaboration of 
the elements of this crime.[2] In exploring this matter, the Appeals Chamber defined the 
subjective (mens rea) and objective elements (actus reus) of terrorism by referring to domestic 
Lebanese law and international law. It thereby set out the applicable law for the court. The 
consequence of this decision however is not limited to the law of STL but may be seen as having 
far-reaching consequences for the conception of terrorism under both international law and 
International Criminal Law (ICL). Given the significance of the Appeals Chamber judgment, this 
paper will scrutinise three areas of concern regarding its propriety:
a) Firstly, how the Appeals Chamber judges perceived their judicial role in light of three 
considerations: the mixed domestic/international nature of the STL, the wording of the 
Statute and methods of interpretation (section I); 
b) Secondly how the Appeals Chamber constructed and justified its definition of the 
objective and subjective elements of terrorism given the absence of a positivist 
framework that defines international terrorism (section II); and 
c) Thirdly how the significance of this decision may impact on the law of terrorism under 
international law and ICL (section III). 
Section IV will provide conclusions following the three-part analysis. 
Background of STL 
Before addressing these questions individually, this section will provide a brief outline of the 
tribunal, its Statute and the PTC request. The STL is the first international court that has been 
vested with jurisdiction ratione materiae for terrorism. It was established pursuant to an 
Agreement between the UN and the Lebanese Republic (Security Council Resolution 1664 
(2005)) to investigate the 2005 assassination of the former Prime Minister Hariri Rafiq and 22 
others in a bomb attack. In January 2011, the PTC submitted 15 questions to the Appeals 
Chamber on points of law regarding substantive crimes, modes of liability and cumulative 
charging. One of the questions concerned the definition of terrorism to be applied by the 
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Tribunal. However neither had the Agreement nor had the Statute of the STL provided for an 
elaborate definition of terrorism. Consequently this task was left to the judges. The only 
guidance provided in the Statute of the STL concerning terrorism was article 2 which reads as 
follows: 
‘The following shall be applicable to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes referred to in 
article 1, subject to the provisions of this Statute:
(a) The provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and 
punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, 
illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding 
the material elements of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy; and 
(b) Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on “Increasing the penalties for 
sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle”.’[3] 
Sections I and II below will address the interpretation of this article. 
 
I. The perception of the judicial role
The first aspect of the ruling that requires scrutiny is the perception of the judicial role. 
Underlying this issue is a concern regarding the nature of adjudication that is befitting for this 
Tribunal. This concern may be couched in the following manner: should the STL judges perceive 
their role as judges applying domestic Lebanese law only or as judges applying both domestic 
and international law? These two conceptions reveal two models of adjudication: the domestic 
and the international judge. These models have different implications on the scope of law of 
terrorism and its defining elements (to be discussed in section II). To elucidate, if the domestic 
model applies, then the definition of terrorism is circumscribed to the law provided under the 
domestic Lebanese Criminal Code solely. Judges are domestic judges who merely apply the law 
as it is (lex lata). However if the international model applies, then the role of the international 
judge adds interpretive problems. In light of contentious sources of international law such as 
treaty law[4] and customary international law (CIL), the interpretive process may import 
ambiguous, unforeseen and non-domestically implemented concepts regarding the definition of 
terrorism. Such a broad definition of the judicial role may confer a law-making power on the 
judges who are subsequently in a position to decide what the law ought to be (lex ferenda). This 
brief discussion indicates that at the heart of the formulation of terrorism lies a crucial discussion 
of whether the STL Appeals Chamber judges perceived their role as domestic or international 
law judges. Consequently, a detailed examination of this matter is warranted, beginning with 
how the judicial role is defined in international law.  
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In addressing this matter however, one is confronted with a practical difficulty. Defining the 
judicial role in international law has remained an under-explored theme within academic 
discourse. As argued by Wessel, there is ‘no general theory of judging in the international 
context.’[5] This is particularly problematic for ICL which has witnessed a surge in International 
Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) such as the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993;[6] the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994;
[7] the Special Court for Sierra Leonne (SCSL) in 2000;[8] the Extraordinary Court of Chambers 
in Cambodia (ECCC) in 2003 [9]and recently the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
One can nevertheless gain a glimpse of how the international judge operates by turning to 
discussions of former judges. A relevant example in this context is former ICTY Judge Patricia 
Wald. Having previously worked as a US Court of Appeals Judge in the District of Columbia,
[10] she was selected as a US Judge for the ICTY in 1999. She commented on how, in her early 
days at the ICTY, she knew nothing on international judging despite being a US judge.[11] 
Although she does not expound this comment, it is clear that she suggests a difference between 
the two forms of judging identified in this paper. In her further commentaries and articles, she 
refers to the use of sources of law, interpretive reasoning and the structure of a Tribunal as 
providing key guidance in adjudicating cases.[12] 
These three factors will be used as a framework to explain the role of the STL Appeals Chamber 
judges in this paper. By applying these factors in a STL paradigm, this paper will take into 
account the nature of the Tribunal, the semantic formulation of article 2, other relevant sources of 
law and the judicial reasoning provided by the Chamber. The following paragraphs will elaborate 
these matters.   
Nature of STL: Domestic or international court? 
The nature of the STL can be outlined by comparing it with one of the aforementioned tribunals, 
the ICTY. This tribunal is a widely recognised international court that applies international law. 
No controversy arises from the fact that the judges are international judges applying international 
law. The same however cannot be said about the STL. In evaluating the description of the STL 
based on its mandate and Statute, its nature appears uncertain. 
On one hand, it is established under chapter 7 of the UN Charter and the Security Council 
Resolution 1757, which outlines its Statute, refers to its international character. This description 
suggests that it is an international tribunal. On the other hand, article 2 of its Statute clearly states 
that it should apply Lebanese law. The characterisations of domestic and international are 
therefore unhelpful in explaining its nature. Since this discussion does not offer assistance, one 
may turn to the judgment. However, even from this perspective, the judges have struggled to 
explain consistently the nature of the court as they comment interchangeably on the domestic 
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and international aspects. In several paragraphs the decision notes how the Statute is novel since 
the Tribunal should apply ‘solely the substantive criminal law of a particular country’[13] and 
how ‘we (the judges) are called upon primarily to apply national law to the facts coming within 
our jurisdiction.’[14] Contrastingly, it then makes several references to its international character,
[15] what other international tribunals have held[16] and the fact that ‘(t)he Tribunal is not bound 
by the definitions or classifications set out in the Statute, which reflect the political perspectives 
of the Statute’s framers.’[17]  On the face of it, these remarks indicate two inconsistent positions 
by suggesting both a domestic and international character. However, following this analysis, the 
ruling makes an important remark. It declares that the ‘starting point is the criminal law of 
Lebanon’[18] but that ‘(a)s an international  court, we may depart from the application and 
interpretation of national law by national courts under certain conditions (…).’[19] In light of 
this comment, this paper contends that the Tribunal should be better viewed as a mixed or hybrid 
tribunal. Such terminologies have been used when describing aforementioned tribunals such as 
the SCSL and the ECCC.[20] These tribunals were considered mixed as they were set up through 
international agreements, employ international personnel but also refer to and apply domestic 
and international law. Similarities can be drawn with the structure of the STL. 
Having addressed the identity through this discussion, it is important to return to the foregoing 
judicial statement. A key point is the reference to the phrase ‘we may depart from the 
application.’ The italicised permissive term ‘may’ indicates that the judges were not under an 
obligation to depart from national law[21] but that they exercised their discretion in deciding so. 
The ruling justified this exercise of discretion by listing the following conditions under which it 
can depart from national law: unreasonableness; manifest injustice and lack of consonance with 
international principles that are binding upon Lebanon. Through this explanation, it had set out a 
reason for adopting a non-domestic role within a hybrid tribunal. This was founded on the 
necessity of incorporating international law within the applicable law of the STL to embrace a 
broader definition of terrorism than the one outlined under Lebanese law. This argument 
constitutes the focal point of this paper.
Appellate Chambers’ judicial reasoning
Having outlined this contention, the judges turned to the appropriate interpretation of article 2 of 
the Statute. The wording of this article, which has been cited in the introduction, is formulated in 
unambiguous and clear language. It contends that the applicable law is domestic Lebanese law. 
Its interpretation is therefore of interest considering the expansive judicial role and the fact that 
the wording of the text is clear. On this matter, the Defence and the Prosecutor both submitted 
that the judges should follow the law as has been set out under article 2, thereby embracing a lex 
lata approach. The Prosecutor[22] and the Defence[23] collectively agreed that the Tribunal 
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must apply Lebanese law to the crimes established under article 2. The Defence further stressed 
that the Tribunal should not apply international law.[24] 
Despite these arguments, the judges embraced a different view. In line with their broad 
international based mandate, clarity of language did not matter. The judges argued that the 
‘construction (of a text) is the end result after all legitimate considerations have been 
employed.’[25] Consequently, attention shifts to ‘(t)he question (of) what those legitimate 
considerations are.’[26] In this regard, the judgment distinguishes itself from many other 
international judicial decisions. It regularly refers to the work of jurisprudential theorists such as 
Hart,[27] Dworkin,[28] Anzilotti,[29] Lauterpacht[30] and Bentham.[31] By doing so, it garners 
support for its expansive judicial role and the need to incorporate international law even in the 
absence of a gap and clear language. The judges subsequently rejected the Defence Counsel 
arguments namely that only Lebanese law is applicable; that it is only under circumstances of 
ambiguity and a lacuna that judges should look beyond the text of a statute[32] and that the 
principle of in dubio mitius (in case of doubt one should prefer the interpretation more 
favourable to a sovereign state) should apply.[33] By explaining its purpose as ‘identifying with 
some precision both what the law of Lebanon requires and to what extent, if at all, its application 
is modified by the Statute,’[34] the Tribunal expressed a preference for the inclusion of 
international law to buttress domestic Lebanese law. It justified its reasoning on the basis of 
principles of interpretation such as the teleological form of interpretation and the principle of 
effectiveness[35] so as to administer justice in a fair and efficient manner. Furthermore it relied 
on a general principle of construction which it argued was common to many States of the world, 
namely the principle that one should construe the national legislation of a State in such a manner 
as to align it as much as possible to international legal standards binding upon the State.[36] In 
this vein, it jettisoned any suggestion that the Tribunal should be seen as a domestic one applying 
Lebanese law only. It favoured a definition of terrorism beyond domestic law.
In conclusion, the following picture of the judicial role is formed. The Appeals Chamber judges 
defined their role broadly by describing themselves as judges who were tasked with applying not 
only domestic Lebanese criminal law but such law which is in consonance with international 
law. The judges embraced an expansive role (lex ferenda) so as to widen the scope of terrorism 
beyond domestic law despite the fact that article 2 of the Statute is unambiguous in its reference 
to domestic law only. As noted in the judgment, the judges regarded themselves as concerned 
with legitimate considerations of construction and rejected an ordinary interpretation of terms in 
the absence of ambiguity or a gap. Reference to international law as a source of law would entail 
resorting to expedient treaty law and CIL to define the elements of terrorism. This is explored in 
the next section.
II. Defining the subjective and objective elements 
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The definition of the subjective and objective elements follows the analysis above as the 
conception of judicial role largely determines the law to be applied. Had the Appeals Chamber, 
on the basis of a narrow interpretation of its role, believed that the only applicable law is 
domestic law (Lebanese Criminal Code), then the elements would be defined according to this 
criminal code. This role provides for clarity and consistency regarding the elements which are 
foreseeable and predictable to the offender. However, as already concluded, the Appeals 
Chamber embraced a broader approach by arguing that international law is applicable. 
Consequently, the scope of the subjective and objective elements changes due to other sources of 
law. In this context, we are discussing the application of treaty law and CIL. However, 
broadening the scope of applicable law in this manner leads to three notable difficulties. 
Firstly the international community has failed to agree on a common definition of terrorism. As 
of recently, an IBA Task Force Report concluded that there is no agreed definition of terrorism in 
international law.[37] Therefore in the absence of a positivist framework, the task of defining the 
subjective and objective elements based on international law is a contentious matter. Secondly, 
the rule of nullem crimen sine lege (NCSL) carries considerable weight in any over-expansive 
definition of the Appeals Chamber. The rule of NCSL safeguards defendants against arbitrary 
definitions and allows interpretation in so far as it is reasonable, accessible and foreseeable. 
Thirdly, how would the judges strike the balance between the existing definition provided under 
Lebanese law and international law since the Appeals Chamber concluded that the starting point 
is the criminal law of Lebanon? 
With these considerations outlined, the legal background was established for the Appeals 
Chamber judges to define the elements. The construction of the subjective and objective 
elements takes place in light of three sources of law: the domestic Lebanese Criminal Code, 
relevant treaty law (in this case, the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (ACST)) 
and CIL in times of peace only. Although the judgement considered CIL in general, it concluded 
that only a definition of CIL in times of peace has emerged.[38] As will be indicated below, the 
approach of the Appeals Chamber in defining the elements is in line with its broad perception of 
the judicial role. The principal area of concern is the amount of change introduced to the 
elements under the Lebanese Criminal Code by the other two sources of law. This matter is 
important as the Appeals Chamber had underlined that although the Lebanese Criminal Code 
provides the starting point for discussion, it would not, on its own, represent the final meaning of 
terrorism to be applied by the STL. To comparatively assess these changes, it is necessary to 
outline the provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code. 
Under Lebanese Law, article 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code defines the elements 
accordingly:
The objective element as:[39]
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• ‘an act whether constituting an offence under other provisions of the Criminal Code 
or not; and 
• the use of a means “liable to create a public danger.”’
The subjective element as: 
• The special intent to cause a state of terror.[40]
Defining the subjective element 
The Appeals Chamber defined the subjective element by proposing that the Lebanese Criminal 
Code should be analysed first, albeit, in light and on the basis of the relevant international rules.
[41] Having acknowledged the definition as the special intent of spreading terror of panic among 
the population,[42] the ruling then turned to the law of the ACST and CIL in times of peace. In 
reviewing the ACST, the judgment acknowledged that while Lebanon had ratified the treaty, it 
had not domestically implemented it. It nevertheless did not find itself constrained by a lack of 
domestic implementation and took the view after analysing several cases that the ACST is still 
applicable.[43] The Appellate Chamber’s approach can however be criticised as, despite taking 
note of the ACST definition to ‘sow panic and fear,’[44] it did not address whether the Lebanese 
Criminal Code should be modified. It therefore left the question of whether the ACST displaces 
the domestic provision unresolved. 
Turning to CIL in times of peace, it adopted a similar attitude by not addressing the hierarchy of 
law between CIL and the domestic provision. However, before analysing the definition provided 
under CIL, certain comments need to be made about the use of this source of law in general. 
Several academics as Roberts,[45] Meron[46] and Mendelson[47] have highlighted how CIL can 
be used in a controversial, subjective and almost arbitrary manner. The controversy surrounding 
its use in this context is apparent as the Defence Counsel and the Prosecutor had argued that 
there is no settled definition of terrorism as a crime under CIL while the Appeals Chamber 
argued the contrary. To further highlight the controversy, a survey conducted by Saul in 2006 
concluded that ‘(a)rguments that terrorism is a customary international crime are 
premature.’ [48]Yet Cassese, who was one of the STL Appeals Chamber judges, held in a 
separate academic publication in 2004 that ‘(…) a definition of terrorism does exist, and this 
phenomenon also amounts to a customary international law crime.’[49] These examples indicate 
the uncertainty of law generated through the use of CIL. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber in 
light of its broad international law based mandate decided to rely on this source of law. It defined 
the subjective element of terrorism as a crime in times of peace as:
• 	
 the intent (dolus) of the underlying crime; and 
• 	
 the special intent (dolus specialis) to spread fear or coerce authority.[50] 
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Yet, in reviewing the three definitions together (Lebanese Criminal Code, ACST and CIL), it 
however did not modify the subjective element from its original definition under the Lebanese 
Criminal Code. The eventual definition agreed upon as applicable for the STL was the intent of 
the perpetrator to cause a state of terror.[51] The Appeals Chamber did not question whether the 
ACST definition of sowing panic or the CIL definition of spreading fear modifies the Lebanese 
Criminal Code provision. 
Defining the objective element 
Contrastingly, the construction of the objective element is marked by a higher level of judicial 
creativity than the interpretation of the subjective one. The controversy surrounds the level of 
influence that international law had on existing Lebanese jurisprudence. By evaluating the 
judgment, it is evident that the Appeals Chamber judges adopted a broader interpretation of the 
objective element than provided for under article 314 of the domestic code. The key contentious 
matter was the definition of means in the phrase ‘means to create public danger’ under article 314 
of the Lebanese Criminal Code. 
Lebanese jurisprudence had narrowly defined the term, circumscribing its scope to a specific list. 
These means are indicated in an illustrative enumeration: explosive devices, inflammable 
materials, poisonous or incendiary products, or infectious or microbial agents. According to 
Lebanese case law, these means do not include such non-enumerated implements as a gun, a 
machine-gun, a revolver, a letter bomb or a knife.[52] However under the ACST and CIL in times 
of peace, there was no such restraint. The Appeals Chamber opted to jettison the domestic 
definition in favour of the international law approach. It firstly compared the scope of domestic 
law with the ACST and secondly with CIL in times of peace. In its analysis, it reached the 
following conclusions. The ACST embraces a broader definition of terrorism than Lebanese law 
since it does not require that the act was committed by specific means, instrumentalities or 
devices.[53] CIL in times of peace is broader than Lebanese law with regard to the means of 
carrying out the terrorist act, which are not limited under international law but it is narrower as it 
(i) requires both an underlying criminal act and an intent to commit that act and (ii) involves a 
transnational element.[54]
By embracing similar reasoning as outlined in section I, it chose to interpret the Lebanese 
Criminal Code in line with international law. This effectively meant abandoning domestic law in 
favour of CIL in times of peace and adopting a broad definition of means to create public danger. 
It extended the domestic definition of crimes to include other implements under the domestic 
Criminal Code as handguns, machine guns and other machinery depending upon the 
circumstances of the case so long as ‘the means used to carry out the terrorist attack also be liable 
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to create a common danger, either by exposing bystanders or onlookers to harm or by instigating 
further violence in the form of retaliation or political instability.’[55]
By focusing on a broad interpretive approach, which is rooted in international legal definitions, 
the Appeals Chamber reasoning however calls into question the role of NCSL. The STL 
addressed this matter by stating that broadening the objective element[56] does not run counter to 
this principle because ‘(i) this interpretation is consistent with the offence as explicitly defined 
under Lebanese law; (ii) it was accessible to the accused, especially given the publication of the 
Arab Convention and other international treaties ratified by Lebanon in the Official Gazette 
(none of which limits the means or implements by which terrorist acts may be performed); (iii) 
hence, it was reasonably foreseeable by the accused.’[57] In addition, it chose to adopt several 
aspects of the international legal definition since in its opinion, the ‘unique gravity’[58] and 
‘transnational dimension’[59] of crimes had to be taken into account. In short, the objective 
element was defined in a broad manner based on the fact that the judges had an international 
mandate and not a domestic one. 
Definition of terrorism 
After scrutinising domestic law, treaty law and CIL, the reasoning of the Appeals chamber 
culminated in the following definition of terrorism:[60]  
(i)  the volitional commission of an act; 
(ii)  through means that are liable to create a public danger; and
(iii)  the intent of the perpetrator to cause a state of terror.
The key change that has been introduced by the Appeals Chamber is the scope of ‘means’ under 
(ii). In conclusion, the definition of the objective element raises more controversy than the 
subjective one. The decision to incorporate international legal elements and broaden the 
definition may be seen as infringing defendant rights. However the Appeals Chamber chose to 
focus on emphasising the role of international law. It essentially fused domestic with 
international law to provide a wide definition of the objective element. In conclusion, the only 
aspect of domestic law that has been retained is the subjective element. 
III. Significance of the judgment 
The final argument of this paper evaluates the relevance of the judgment in international law. 
One must assess its possible influence on other tribunals and the international community since 
its application is circumscribed to the jurisdiction of the STL. Three comments can be posited. 
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Firstly the STL Appeals Judgment may be seen as making a vital contribution. As a definition of 
terrorism is absent from international law and ICL, the decision provides judges with guidance 
and authority in different ways. Foremost, the formulation of CIL offers an account of 
widespread state practice and convincing opinio juris. Secondly the reliance on CIL strengthens 
the judgment’s legitimacy as this source of law has been described by the former International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) President, Judge Higgins, as ‘binding on all nations.’[61] This justification 
itself may provide sufficient legal ground for international tribunals and domestic courts to apply 
this definition. Thirdly, Mylonaki, argues that the ruling sets a precedent for the UN to establish 
other ICTs and facilitates how future terrorist acts should be dealt with.[62] The decision may 
thus be seen as an important turning point for international law.
However, a second and different perspective can be offered. Although CIL is an important source 
of law for many tribunals, its use is marked by inconsistency. As briefly discussed in section II, 
the use of CIL is controversial due to its indeterminacy and fluidity. In certain cases, it may play 
a crucial role as in the case of the STL Appeals Judgment. However, in others, it may be rejected. 
For example, the Netherlands Supreme Court case of ReBourtese[63] overturned a Court of 
Appeal conviction for torture as a crime against humanity on the basis that CIL, as a source of 
law, is too vague. This critique of CIL has in fact been duly noted by the Appeals Chamber which 
acknowledged that CIL is not applicable in all tribunals.[64] In addition to this argument, CIL is 
furthermore controversial in this context as its vagueness has produced two contradictory 
opinions. While the STL Appeals Chamber holds that a CIL definition of terrorism in times of 
peace exists, Saul contends that terrorism as an international crime under CIL has not yet 
matured.[65] Collectively, these views of CIL undermine the strength of the judgment. As a final 
criticism, whether judges in a different tribunal decide to incorporate the reference to the decision 
made by the STL Appeals Chamber depends upon their discretion, the type of conflict in place 
and the relevance of the Appeals Chamber judgment to the factual context in question. As 
indicated by the Tribunal, ‘(t)his interpretation is not binding per se on courts other than the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, although it may of course be used as an interpretation of the 
applicable legal provisions in other cases where terrorism is charged.’[66] Therefore it is 
questionable whether the decision will leave a lasting impact for any type of tribunal, whether a 
UN-backed court, a hybrid tribunal or even a domestic tribunal.
Thirdly, regardless of its impact in a tribunal, the judgment may provide a credible starting point 
for future discussions by law-makers. Within international law, it remains to be seen whether the 
definition could be of any relevance to the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, 
domestic parliamentary committees or regional counter-terrorist organisations. Within ICL, the 
definition may be considered as a point of discussion by the Assembly of State Parties of the 
ICC. The 1994 ILC Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court which set out provisions for 
a possible international criminal court initiated the discussion for the current ICC Statute. 
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Similarly, this judgment may furnish key points for forthcoming debates at the ICC as terrorism 
as an international crime for the ICC would require an articulation of the subjective and objective 
elements. In contrast, a definition of terrorism under international law does not.  
IV. Conclusions 
Overall, this paper has explored three areas of the STL Appeals Judgment: the perception of the 
judicial role, the elements of terrorism and its impact in an international context. Notwithstanding 
the last issue, the analysis has lengthily illustrated the inter-connectedness between defining a 
crime and the role that a judge plays. As a conclusion, this paper draws on this analysis to portray 
how the judge, the tribunal and the international community share a complex relationship in 
defining crimes. If the international community is to define terrorism as an international crime, it 
is this relationship that is to be carefully scrutinised. 
From a practical perspective, the onus of providing an international definition of terrorism falls 
squarely on the international community. Individual states discuss, negotiate and compromise on 
definitions to find common agreement on the meaning of terrorism. However, by using the STL 
Judgment as a case study, it is clear that the dearth of legal instruments reflects the inability of 
states to do so. Moreover, the recent failure during the Rome Statute negotiations is further 
evidence of the difficulties of states in finding commonality. In the event of such a failure, judges 
will be called upon to decide its meaning if a tribunal is established to adjudicate a crime of 
terrorism. The judges, who are therefore left without a definition by states, are vested with much 
discretion to frame a meaning. The conclusion is that if states fail to provide a precise definition 
to protect the rights of the defendant and define terrorism within certain limits, then this task will 
inevitably fall in the unpredictable hands of judges as witnessed in the STL Appeals Judgment.  
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